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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEARCHES WITHOUT

EXCLUSIONARY SANCTIONS

United States v. Herrold (1992)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
in part that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated."' The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require the suppression of evidence
seized pursuant to an unconstitutional search. 2 In connection with this
interpretation, the Supreme Court has developed the exclusionary rule,
4
3
which prohibits the introduction of both tangible and testimonial evidence seized or acquired during an unlawful search. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has applied the exclusionary rule to prohibit the introduction of evidence derived from other evidence that was illegally obtained initially, as well as evidence acquired as an indirect result of an
5

unlawful search.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has recognized various excep-

tions to the exclusionary rule, allowing courts to admit illegally obtained
evidence in cases in which its suppression would not further the rule's

underlying purpose of deterring future Fourth Amendment violations
by law enforcement officials. 6 One such exception to the exclusionary
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment further sets forth the
probable cause requirement for the issuance of a search warrant. Id. Specifically, a search warrant must be supported by oath or affirmation and must be
particularized with regard to the place to be searched and the evidence to be
seized. Id.
2. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886) (holding that evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in proceedings against defendant).
3. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evidence of
tangible materials seized during unlawful search).
4. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961) (holding that
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evidence of
testimony concerning knowledge acquired during unlawful search).
5. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The Wong Sun
Court held that the exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction into evidence of
derivative evidence, both tangible and testimonial, when its acquisition is the
product or indirect result of primary evidence obtained in an illegal search. Id.
at 484-86. This requirement that indirect and derivative evidence be excluded
along with the primary evidence of an illegal search is often referred to as the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Id.
6. See, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) (noting that "[tihe primary
justification for the exclusionary rule ... is the deterrence of police conduct that

(1174)
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rule is the independent source doctrine. 7 Pursuant to this doctrine, evidence is admissible despite illegal police investigatory activity as long as
the evidence was discovered through a source independent of the illegality. 8 Based on this doctrine, the United States Supreme Court held
in its 1988 decision in Murray v. United States9 that evidence obtained
pursuant to an independently obtained search warrant need not be suppressed, even though a portion of such evidence was observed in plain
view at the time of a prior illegal entry.' 0
The Murray Court focused on the question of whether a legal
search, pursuant to a warrant, was a genuinely independent source of
information and tangible evidence which the defense sought to have the
Court suppress."I The Court concluded that a subsequent legal search
could be a genuinely independent source of the evidence, unless "the
agents' decision to seek the warrant was prompted by what they had
seen during the initial entry, or if information obtained during that [illegal] entry was presented to the Magistrate and affected his decision to
2
issue the warrant."'
In United States v. Herrold,13 the United States Court of Appeals for

the Third Circuit recently applied the Murray Court's independent
source analysis. 14 In Herrold, the Third Circuit held that a court need
not suppress evidence obtained during a lawful search despite its original discovery during an unlawful entry, as long as the subsequent lawful
violates Fourth Amendment rights"). See generally Molly A. Meegan, Twenty-First
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals
1990-1991, 80 GEO. L.J. 939, 1096-1108 (1992) (discussing exceptions to exclusionary rule and collecting cases).

7. Meegan, supra note 6, at 1099. The United States Supreme Court has
identified four exceptions to the exclusionary rule: 1) the good faith exception;
2) the attenuation exception; 3) the inevitable discovery exception; and 4) the
independent source exception. Id. For a discussion of the independent source
exception to the exclusionary rule, see infra notes 35-64 and accompanying text.
8. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988); Meegan, supra
note 6, at 1106.
9. 487 U.S. 533 (1988). For a further discussion of the facts of Murray and
the Supreme Court's analysis, see infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
10. Murray, 487 U.S. at 536-44. The Murray Court reasoned that a subsequent search pursuant to a lawfully obtained warrant could serve as an independent source of evidence originally discovered unlawfully. Id. at 541-42.
11. Id. at 542.
12. Id. The Murray Court concluded that the district court had not explicitly found whether the agents would have sought a warrant if they had not initially entered the warehouse illegally. Id. at 543. Consequently, the Court
remanded the case to the court of appeals, with instructions that it remand to

the district court for a determination of whether the subsequent warranted
search was indeed prompted by information obtained in the prior illegal search
of the warehouse. Id. at 543-44.
13. 962 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 421 (1992). For a further
discussion of the facts of Herrold and the analysis of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, see infra notes 65-120 and accompanying text.
14. Herrold, 962 F.2d at 1139-44.
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search was an independent source of the evidence at issue.' 5 However,
the facts of Herrold differed from the facts of Murray in one significant
respect. In Murray, the evidence discovered during the prior unlawful
entry was not included in the affidavit for a search warrant. 16 Thus, it
was clear that such evidence had not "affected" the Magistrate's decision
to issue the warrant. In Herrold, by contrast, the evidence discovered
during the prior unlawful entry was included in the affidavit for a search
warrant.1 7 Nonetheless, the Third Circuit concluded that even though
the warrant application contained information obtained through an unlawful entry, this did not "per force" indicate that the Magistrate's decision to issue the warrant was "affected" by such information.' 8
This Casebrief first reviews the development of the exclusionary
rule, focusing on the application of the independent source exception. 19
Next, this Casebrief details the facts of United States v. Herrold and sets
forth the reasoning employed and the conclusions reached by the Third
Circuit.2 0 Finally, this Casebrief discusses the contrasting policy argu-

ments underlying the exclusionary rule and the independent source exception, which provided the source of disagreement between the sharply
divided majority and dissent in Murray.2 1 This Casebrief ultimately concludes that courts, including the Third Circuit, should carefully consider
the policies underlying the Murray Court's decision before extending
the Murray holding to different factual situations, in order to avoid placing the Fourth Amendment rights of all citizens in serious jeopardy. 22
II. BACKGROUND

The exclusionary rule requires the suppression of evidence ob15. Id. at 1140-44.
16. Murray, 487 U.S. at 535-36. The Court relied on the district court's
findings that the agents did not reveal their warrantless entry to the Magistrate,
and that they omitted from their warrant application any recitation of their observations made during the prior illegal entry. Id. at 543.
17. Herrold, 962 F.2d at 1135. The warrant application in Herrold contained
facts relating to events that occurred prior to the officers' illegal entry into the
defendant's trailer, and also included information relating to events occurring
and observations made after the illegal entry. Id. at 1134-35.
18. Id. at 1141. The Herrold court instead concentrated on the question of
whether the search warrant application contained probable cause for the issuance of a warrant apart from the improper information. Id.
19. For a complete discussion of the development of the exclusionary rule
and the independent source doctrine, see infra notes 23-64 and accompanying
text.
20. For a complete discussion of the facts and analysis in Herrold, see infra
notes 65-120 and accompanying text.
21. For a complete discussion of the contrasting policy arguments underlying the exclusionary rule and the independent source doctrine, see infra notes
120-36 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the practical implications of the Herrold and Murray
opinions, see infra notes 134-36.
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tained directly or indirectly through government violations of the
Fourth,2 3 Fifth, 24 or Sixth Amendments. 2 5 In the Fourth Amendment
context, the Supreme Court has frequently identified the deterrence of
illegal law enforcement activities as the primary policy goal underlying
the exclusionary rule. 26 In Weeks v. United States, 2 7 the Supreme Court
held that the exclusionary rule prohibited the introduction into evidence
of tangible materials seized during an unlawful search. 28 Later, in
Silverman v. United States, 29 the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary
rule prohibited the introduction into evidence of testimony concerning
knowledge acquired during an unlawful search. 30 Additionally, in Wong
Sun v. United States, 3 1 the Supreme Court formulated the "fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine" to prohibit the introduction of derivative evidence, both tangible and testimonial, acquired as a direct or indirect
result of an unlawful search. 32 Finally, in Mapp v. Ohio, 33 the Supreme
Court held that the exclusionary rule applied to the states via the Four34
teenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court's development of the exclusionary rule and the
"independent source" doctrine as an exception to the rule occurred almost simultaneously. 35 The Supreme Court first adopted the independ23. For a discussion of the development of the exclusionary rule in the context of the Fourth Amendment, see infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
24. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 (1960) (holding that exclusionary rule applies in state court to defendant's confession obtained through
Fifth Amendment violations); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 547-48
(1897) (holding that exclusionary rule applies in federal court to defendant's
confession obtained through Fifth Amendment violations).
25. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237-39 (1967) (excluding witness identification evidence because uncounseled postindictment lineup violated
Sixth Amendment); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-07 (1964) (excluding evidence of defendant's statements because deliberately elicited in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment rights).
26. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) (noting that "[t]he primary justification for the exclusionary rule ... is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights"); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 906 (1984) (noting that exclusionary rule operates as "a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect" (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974))).
27. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
28. Id. at 398. In Weeks, police made a warrantless entry into the defendant's home when he was not present and seized various papers and articles that
were used as evidence against the defendant at trial. Id. at 386.
29. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
30. Id. at 511-12. In Silverman, police placed an electronic listening device
inside a house used by the defendants and overheard conversations that were
used as evidence against the defendants at trial. Id.
31. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
32. Id. at 484-86.
33. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
34. Id. at 659-60.
35. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (citing Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)).
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ent source exception to the exclusionary rule in its 1920 decision in
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.3 6 In Silverthorne, the Court held
that knowledge of facts gained from copies of illegally seized documents
could not be used to obtain an indictment or to secure a subpoena for
the originals. 37 In dicta, the Silverthorne Court noted that although police had obtained knowledge of the facts in an unlawful manner, these
facts did not become "sacred and inaccessible."' 38 Rather, at trial, a
prosecutor could prove such facts like any others, as long as knowledge
of those facts was derived from an independent, lawful source untainted
39
by the initial illegality.
In Segura v. United States,40 the Supreme Court held that a prior illegal entry did not require the Court to suppress evidence subsequently
discovered at those premises by police executing a validly obtained
search warrant. 4 1 In Segura, law enforcement agents unlawfully entered
the defendant's apartment and waited inside until other agents obtained
a search warrant. 4 2 Despite the illegal entry, the Segura Court held that
the evidence found for the first time during the execution of the valid
search warrant was admissible because it was discovered pursuant to an
43
independent source.
In Murray, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a
portion of evidence that police obtained pursuant to an independently
36. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
37. Id. at 391-92.
38. Id. at 392.
39. Id. The Murray Court referred to this original version of the independent source doctrine as the "specific" sense of the doctrine. Murray, 487 U.S. at
538. The Murray Court noted that the Silverthorne Court originally applied the

independent source doctrine in the exclusionary rule context "with reference to
that particular category of evidence acquired by an untainted search which is identical to the evidence unlawfully acquired." Id. The Murray Court acknowledged that
this specific sense of the independent source doctrine was the doctrine's more
important use for purposes of the Court's analysis in Murray. Id. For a discussion of the independent source doctrine's more "general" sense, see infra note
43.
40. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
41. Id. at 813-14.
42. Id. at 802.
43. Id. at 813-14. The Murray Court referred to this version of the independent source doctrine as the "general" sense of the doctrine. Murray, 487
U.S. at 537-38. The Murray Court noted that the more general sense of the
independent source doctrine "identifies all evidence acquired in a fashion untainted by the illegal evidence-gathering activity." Id. In an example, the Murray
Court explained that where an unlawful entry has given investigators knowledge
of facts x and y, but fact z has been learned by other means, the independent
source doctrine in its more "general" sense would render fact z admissible because it was derived from an independent source. Id. at 538. In contrast, in its
more "specific" sense the independent source doctrine would render facts x and
y admissible if knowledge of those facts was derived from an independent
source. Id. For a further discussion of the independent source doctrine's "specific" sense, see supra note 39.
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obtained search warrant should be suppressed because they had ob44
served such evidence in plain view at the time of a prior illegal entry.
The Murray Court relied on the independent source doctrine and held
that the Court need not suppress such evidence if the search pursuant to
the warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the informa45
tion and the tangible evidence that the defendant sought to suppress.
The Murray Court set forth a two-part analysis to determine whether the
subsequent valid search was in fact a genuinely independent source of
the evidence. 4 6 First, the agents' decision to seek the warrant must not
47
have been prompted by what they had seen during the initial entry.
Second, the information obtained during the initial entry must not have
been presented to the Magistrate and "affected" his decision to issue the
48
warrant.
The Murray holding is widely cited by courts as authority for the
proposition that evidence discovered during an initial unlawful entry but
"rediscovered" during a subsequent valid search need not be suppressed. 4 9 Notwithstanding this widespread acceptance, however, it is
44. Murray, 487 U.S. at 535. In Murray, federal agents illegally entered a
warehouse and observed numerous burlap-wrapped bales, which they did not
disturb. Id. They returned with a search warrant and seized 270 bales of marijuana and other evidence of crime. Id. at 535-36. In applying for the warrant,
they did not mention the prior entry or include any recitations of their observations made during that entry. Id. The defendants filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized from the warehouse and argued that the warrant was
tainted by the previous unlawful entry. Id. at 536.
45. Id. at 542. The Murray Court focused on the independent source doctrine in its "specific" sense and reasoned that although knowledge that the marijuana was in the warehouse was acquired at the time of the unlawful entry, it was
also acquired at the time of entry pursuant to the warrant. Id. at 541. Therefore, the Court concluded that the independent source doctrine should apply so
long as the "rediscovery" of this knowledge was not the result of the earlier
entry. Id. The Court employed similar reasoning with regard to the bales of
marijuana, and refused to recognize a distinction between the "reseizure" of the
tangible marijuana bales and the "rediscovery" of the intangible knowledge of
their existence. Id. at 541-42. Indeed, the Court concluded that "[tlhe independent source doctrine does not rest upon such metaphysical analysis, but
upon the policy that, while the government should not profit from its illegal
activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise
have occupied." Id. at 542.
46. Id. at 542.
47. Id. In Murray, the Court held that this prong of the analysis was not met
because the district court did not explicitly find that the agents would have
sought a warrant even if they had not earlier entered the warehouse. Id. at 54344. Therefore, the Murray Court concluded that the district court's findings did
not amount to a determination of an independent source, and remanded the
case for a determination of this issue. Id.
48. Id. at 542. In Murray, the Court held that this prong of the analysis was
met because the district court explicitly found that the agents did not reveal
their warrantless entry to the Magistrate and that they did not include any recitations of the observations in the warehouse in their warrant application. Id. at
543.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Restrepo, 966 F.2d 964, 969 (5th Cir. 1992),
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important to note that the Murray Court was sharply divided regarding
the resolution of the issues presented. 50 Indeed, the majority and the
dissent disagreed about the true policy underpinnings of the exclusionary rule as well as about whether the majority's holding would effectively
deter or actually encourage unlawful police conduct. 5 '
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 968 (1993); United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1143
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 421 (1992); United States v. Halliman, 923 F.2d
873, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Salas, 879 F.2d 530, 537-38 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 979 (1989).
50. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988). Murray was a four-tothree decision. Id. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, White and Blackmun. Id. at 544. The dissent consisted ofJustices
Marshall, Stevens and O'Connor. Id. Justices Brennan and Kennedy took no
part in the decision. Id. Indeed, the participation of either of these Justices may
have altered the outcome in Murray. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Note, Murray v.
United States: Legally RediscoveringIllegally DiscoveredEvidence, 39 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 641, 644 n.26 (1988-89) (commenting that Justice Brennan had joined
Segura dissent, which expressed concerns similar to those expressed by dissent in
Murray). But cf. Edwin G. Fee, Jr., Criminal Procedure I: Narrowing the Protection of
the Fourth Amendment, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371, 411 (commenting that nonparticipation ofJustices Brennan and Kennedy had "little practical significance"
because Justice Brennan would have joined dissent while Justice Kennedy would
most likely have joined majority).
51. Murray, 487 U.S. at 544-5 1. The majority in Murray focused its analysis
on the exclusionary rule's goal of "putting the police in the same, not a worse,
position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred." Id. at 537 (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)). In Nix,
this "same position" result was deemed necessary to properly balance "[t]he
interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in
having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime." Nix, 467 U.S. at 434.
The majority in Murray reasoned that if the subsequent search warrant was
determined to be an independent source of the evidence sought to be suppressed, the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule would apply
and the evidence could be introduced against the defendant. Murray, 487 U.S.
541-42. The exclusion of such evidence, the majority concluded, would place
the police in a worse position than they would have occupied if no violation had
occurred, and thus undermine an important goal of the exclusionary rule. Id. at
541.
By contrast, the dissent in Murray focused its analysis on the deterrence
function of the exclusionary rule, and asserted that "[b]y excluding evidence

discovered in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the rule 'compel[s] respect

for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way, by removing
the incentive to disregard it.' " Id. at 544 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). The dissent recognized that
the independent source doctrine was primarily based on the theory that "under
certain circumstances the beneficial deterrent effect that exclusion will have on
future constitutional violations is too slight to justify the social cost of excluding
probative evidence from a criminal trial." Id. at 544-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent argued that the doctrine's applicability to given circumstances should be evaluated with regard to the practical effect that the admission
of evidence in those circumstances would have on the deterrence function of the
exclusionary rule. Id. at 545 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Indeed, while recognizing that the independent source doctrine would be
applicable in some circumstances, the dissent asserted that the admission of the
evidence in Murray, where the evidence was previously discovered illegally, se-
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Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Murray, the Third Circuit
had addressed the independent source doctrine, both implicitly and explicitly. In United States v. Johnson,5 2 although the Third Circuit did not
expressly incorporate the independent source doctrine into its analysis,
the court did address the issue of warrants tainted by the police's inclusion in the affidavit of information they had unlawfully obtained during a
prior search. 53 InJohnson, the Third Circuit rejected a criminal defendant's argument that a search warrant was invalid because the underlying
affidavit was tainted by evidence that the police had seized unlawfully
during a prior search. 54 The Third Circuit held that even assuming
tainted facts were present in the search warrant affidavit, these facts
would not vitiate a warrant otherwise validly issued upon probable cause
55
reflected in the affidavit.
Moreover, in United States v. Zarintash,56 the Third Circuit explicitly
57
recognized the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule.
Indeed, in Zarintash, the Third Circuit held that illegal actions by government agents did not render evidence inadmissible if the government
verely undermined the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule, and ultimately "create[d] an affirmative incentive for [police to engage in]
unconstitutional searches." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned
that obtaining a warrant was inconvenient and that even when probable cause
for a warrant existed, the majority holding would provide police with an incentive to first conduct a "confirmatory" illegal search to determine whether obtaining a warrant would be worthwhile. Id. at 546-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The dissent concluded that an officer would not be deterred from conducting
initial illegal searches by the majority's two-part test because the officer could
get the evidence admitted by withholding the results of the illegal search from
the Magistrate, "rediscovering" the evidence legally and then claiming that the
subsequent search was its independent source. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The majority, however, viewed the incentives differently and argued that its
approach deterred rather than encouraged unlawful police conduct. Id. at 540.
The majority reasoned that when probable cause for a warrant existed, its holding would actually discourage police from first conducting "confirmatory"
searches because the police would then encounter the "onerous" burden of convincing a trial court that the information gained from the illegal entry had not
affected either the law enforcement agent's decision to seek the warrant or the
magistrate's decision to grant it. Id.
52. 690 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1214 (1983).

53. Id. at 63. The Johnson case is characterized in Herrold as involving the
independent source doctrine despite the fact that the doctrine was not explicitly
relied upon by the Johnson court. Herrold, 962 F.2d at 1142 n.10.
54. Johnson, 690 F.2d at 63. In Johnson, the initial entry was under exigent
circumstances by the fire department responding to a fire at the defendant's
home. Id. at 62. The defendant argued that such exigent circumstances did not
extend to the drug squad officers later called to the scene, and that therefore,
this latter portion of the search was unlawful. Id. at 63. The defendant argued
that the evidence discovered by these drug agents tainted the subsequent warrant application and accordingly the subsequent search. Id.
55. Id. at 63.
56. 736 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1984).
57. Id. at 74.
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subsequently learned of the evidence from an independent source.5 8 In
its application of the independent source doctrine, the Third Circuit focused predominantly upon the question of whether the evidence had
been "discovered by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
the primary taint." 59
Furthermore, during the four years between the Murray and Herrold
decisions, several other courts of appeals had applied the Murray holding to facts similar to those in Herrold and had arrived at conclusions
similar to those reached by the Third Circuit in Herrold. In United States
v. Halliman,60 for instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the independent source doctrine
permitted the police to introduce evidence seized during a warranted
search of a hotel room, despite the fact that the emergency search warrant affidavit included information regarding drugs and drug paraphernalia seen by the officers during a prior illegal search. 6 1 Citing Murray,
the D.C. Circuit reasoned that because overwhelming independent
grounds existed to establish probable cause in the search warrant affidavit, the inclusion of the illegally obtained information could not have
"affected" the judge's decision to issue the emergency warrant. 62 Similarly, in United States v. Salas,63 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that Murray precluded the suppression of evi58. Id. (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920)). In Zarintash, the initial illegal search of a suspect's apartment yielded
police a photograph of the defendant, which was ultimately used to identify her
as part of a drug conspiracy. Id. at 73. The defendant was arrested and a subsequent warranted search was undertaken that uncovered additional evidence. Id.
The defendant argued for the suppression of the additional evidence, and
claimed that the exploitation of the illegally obtained photograph by police led
to her identification as part of the drug conspiracy and, thus, to her arrest and
the subsequent search warrant. Id.Nonetheless, the Zarintash court held that
the evidence was admissible because an informer's identification of the defendant did not depend on the photograph and, thus, constituted an independent
source for the discovery of the evidence. Id. at 74.
59. Id. at 73-74 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488
(1963)).
60. 923 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
61. Id. at 880-81. In Halliman, the police had an emergency justification for
initially entering the defendants' hotel room without a warrant. Id. at 878-80.
However, such exigent circumstances did not extend to their search of the remainder of the room and, thus, this further search was held to be unlawful. Id.
at 880. Nonetheless, the Halliman court held that the evidence discovered during this extended search was admissible because the emergency search warrant
subsequently issued constituted an independent source of such evidence. Id.
62. Id. at 880. The Halliman court also concluded that the police officers'
decision to obtain a warrant was not prompted by the evidence discovered during the illegal portion of their search. Id. Indeed, the police had previously
obtained warrants for other hotel rooms occupied by the defendants and would
have also sought a search warrant for the additional room had they known of its
existence. Id. at 878-79.
63. 879 F.2d 530 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 979 (1989).
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dence seized during a warranted search, absent any evidence in the district court record to support an inference that information included in
the affidavit that was obtained during a prior illegal search had "af64
fected" the Magistrate's decision to issue the warrant.
III.

UNITED STATES V. HERROLD

In United States v. Herrold,65 the defendant was approached by a confidential police informant who attempted to arrange a cocaine purchase
with him. 66 The defendant told the informant that he had recently ob67
tained a large quantity of cocaine and would be able to make the sale.
Later that day, the informant paid the defendant $300.00 toward the
purchase, and the defendant agreed to complete the sale two days
later. 6 8
As planned, the informant went to the defendant's trailer while it
was under surveillance. 69 The defendant entered the informant's car,
and during a short drive, the drug deal was completed. 70 Upon completion of the transaction, the informant told the surveillance team that he
had paid an additional $650.00 for the drugs, that the defendant intended to go to a bar later that evening, and that the defendant had
been smoking crack cocaine earlier in the evening and was "squirrely." 7 1 The informant had earlier told the police that the defendant
72
had a gun.
The surveillance team members had originally intended to obtain a
search warrant prior to searching the defendant's trailer. 73 However,
they decided to arrest the defendant in his trailer without obtaining a
search warrant based on the information they had received from the informant.74 A state trooper informed the defendant that he was under
64. Id. at 538. In Salas, police illegally entered the defendants' hotel room
and observed drugs and drug paraphernalia in plain view. Id. at 533. Such observations were included in their subsequent search warrant affidavit. Id. at 534.
Nonetheless, the Salas court denied the defendants' motions to suppress the evidence discovered during the subsequent warranted search because the untainted
information in the search warrant affidavit and the resulting lawful warrant constituted an independent source of such evidence. Id. at 538. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the exclusion of such evidence, solely as a result of the officers' mistaken belief that their initial entry was
justified to prevent destruction of the evidence, would place them in a worse
position than if they had not erred in this regard. Id.
65. 962 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 421 (1992).
66. Id. at 1133.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1134.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. The police were concerned that the defendant would take cocaine
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arrest after the defendant opened the door. 7 5 The trooper, who was
subsequently joined by other officers, forcibly entered the trailer after
the defendant slammed the door and ran down a hallway with a gun in
his hand.76 The defendant eventually surrendered his gun, which the
officers seized, and submitted to arrest. 77 The officers at the scene did
not search the trailer, but they observed drug paraphernalia and cocaine
78
in plain view.
Members of the surveillance team remained at the residence while
other members left to obtain a search warrant. 79 In the search warrant
application, the trooper included facts with respect to the events that
occurred before the officers entered the trailer.8 0 In addition, the affidavit set forth the events that took place following the forced entry into the
defendant's residence. 8 1 The Magistrate issued the warrant and the officers conducted a complete search of the residence, during which they
recovered the cocaine and drug paraphernalia observed during their
82
original entry, as well as additional cocaine and drug paraphernalia.
During his criminal prosecution, the defendant moved to suppress
the evidence discovered in his trailer during both the original entry and
the subsequent search. 83 The district court held that the police had conducted a warrantless search and seizure that violated the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights.8 4 Therefore, the district court suppressed
with him to the bar to sell to other people. Id. In addition, the police were
concerned that due to the trailer's proximity to neighboring residences, they
would be unable to maintain an effective surveillance without alerting the defendant to their presence and giving him the opportunity to destroy the evidence. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1134-35. Specifically, the trooper included such facts as those
supplied by the informant regarding his purchase of drugs from the defendant
and information regarding the positive results of the field test performed on the
purchased drugs. Id.
81. Id. at 1135. Specifically, the trooper included in the affidavit information regarding the defendant's initial resistance and attempt to escape and the
officers' forced entry into the defendant's trailer. Id. The trooper also included
a description of the drugs and drug paraphernalia seen in plain view. Id.
82. Id. The Third Circuit noted that the district court record was unclear,
but concluded that the gun had been seized during the initial unlawful entry. Id.
83. Id.
84. United States v. Herrold, 772 F. Supp. 1483, 1489-94 (M.D. Pa. 1991),
rev'd, 962 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 421 (1992). The Third
Circuit clarified that the district court ordered suppression of the gun seized
during the unlawful entry and of the drugs and drug paraphernalia observed in
plain view during such entry. United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1136 n.2
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 421 (1992).
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the evidence observed and seized at the time of the warrantless entry. 8 5
The government moved for reconsideration on the ground that the
"inevitable discovery" doctrine justified the admission of evidence discovered in the defendant's trailer during both searches.8 6 The district
court denied the government's motion for reconsideration holding that
the government had not established by a preponderance of the evidence
that the evidence discovered during the warrantless entry would have
inevitably been discovered by an independent lawful police investigation.8 7 The government appealed to the Third Circuit from the district
88
court's denial of its motion for reconsideration.

IV.

ANALYSIS

The Third Circuit began its analysis in Herrold with a discussion of
the law regarding tainted warrants. 8 9 The court asserted that tainted
factual averments in a search warrant affidavit do not vitiate a warrant
that is otherwise validly issued upon probable cause reflected in the affidavit. 90 Rather, a court must excise such tainted averments from the
affidavit and determine whether the affidavit contains sufficient other information establishing probable cause. 9 1
85. Herrold, 772 F. Supp. at 1494. The district court did not suppress the
evidence discovered and seized during the subsequent warranted search. Id.
86. Herrold, 962 F.2d at 1136. The government argued that the officers
would inevitably have discovered the gun and the drugs pursuant to a validly
issued warrant. Id. The government reasoned that even assuming the original
entry violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, the subsequent entry
did not because the officers had probable cause to obtain the search warrant for
the defendant's trailer, even without the incriminating information originally obtained during the illegal entry. Id.
87. Id. The district court reasoned that the application for the search warrant was "tainted" by the information obtained during the unlawful first entry
and that, as a result, the subsequent search was invalid. Id. Although the district
court denied the motion for reconsideration based on this analysis, the court did
not suppress the evidence discovered and seized during the warranted search.
Id. The Third Circuit noted this inconsistency and decided that the district court
had intended to suppress all the evidence seized in both entries. Id. at 1137.
88. id. at 1136.
89. Id. at 1137-38. The Third Circuit's discussion of tainted warrants was
in response to the defendant's contention that the search warrant obtained by
police after their illegal entry into his trailer was tainted with evidence derived
from this illegal entry and was, thus, invalid. Id. at 1137. The defendant further
argued that the search conducted pursuant to this invalid warrant was likewise
illegal and, thus, constituted a "poisonous tree," the fruit of which was the evidence discovered during such illegal search. Id.
90. Id. at 1138 (citing United States v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 60, 63 (3d Cir.
1982)).

91. Id. The Third Circuit noted that other circuits have taken similar aproaches to tainted warrant problems. See, e.g., United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d
82, 788 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that inclusion of tainted evidence in affidavit
does not taint warrant if remaining untainted evidence would provide neutral
magistrate with probable cause to issue warrant); United States v. Driver, 776
F.2d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505,

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss4/11

12

Indictor: Constitutional Law - Unconstitutional Searches without Exclusiona

1186

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38: p. 1174

Based on these principles, the Third Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that the second search of his trailer was performed pursuant to an invalid warrant, and that therefore, the evidence discovered
during this unlawful search was the "fruit" of this "poisonous tree" and,
as such, inadmissible. 9 2 The court concluded that the second search
was conducted pursuant to a valid warrant because the warrant affidavit
contained sufficient additional information establishing probable cause,
even after the references to the first entry and the fruits thereof were
93
excised from the affidavit.
The Third Circuit next discussed the distinctions between the independent source exception and the inevitable discovery exception to
the exclusionary rule. 94 The court noted that the independent source
doctrine focuses on what actually happened, whereas the inevitable discovery doctrine focuses on what would have happened had the initial
search not taken place. 95 In Herrold, the Third Circuit reasoned that
with regard to the evidence seized during the second search, there was
no need to speculate as to whether the officers would have obtained a
search warrant or whether they would have discovered the contraband
had the initial search not taken place, because they had already actually
obtained a search warrant and discovered the contraband at issue. 9 6
Therefore, the court concluded that an inevitable discovery analysis was
inappropriate and that the independent source doctrine would provide a
554-56 (1974)) (same); United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 545 (2d Cir.
1984) (holding that court must set aside tainted evidence in affidavit to determine whether remaining facts demonstrate probable cause). In addition, the
Third Circuit noted that the United States Supreme Court, in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978), had "placed its imprimatur on this principle."
Herrold, 962 F.2d at 1138.
92. Herrold, 962 F.2d at 1138-39.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1138-40. This differentiation was made by the Third Circuit in

response to the arguments of both the defendant and the government that the

inevitable discovery doctrine applied to the facts of the case. Id. at 1138. The
government argued that the officers would inevitably have discovered the gun
and the drugs pursuant to a validly issued warrant. Id. at 1136. The government reasoned that, even assuming that the original entry violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, the subsequent entry did not because the
officers had probable cause to obtain the search warrant for the defendant's
trailer even without the incriminating information originally obtained during the
illegal entry. Id. In contrast, the defendant argued that "it was improper for a
reviewing court to excise informati6n in a warrant application obtained through
unlawful means to evaluate whether the police would have [inevitably] discovered
the incriminating evidence lawfully." Id. at 1138.
95. Id. at 1140. The court stated that under the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence is admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered through
lawful means, despite the fact that the search leading to its actual discovery was
unlawful. Id. The court contrasted the independent source doctrine, under
which evidence is admissible if it was in fact discovered lawfully and not as a
direct or indirect result of illegal activity. Id.
96. Id. at 1139.
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better analytical framework. 9 7
Focusing on the independent source doctrine, the Third Circuit discussed the doctrine's application by the United States Supreme Court in
Murray v. United States.9 8 The Third Circuit reviewed the theoretical underpinnings of both the exclusionary rule and the independent source
doctrine, as set forth by the majority in Murray.9 9 The Third Circuit
noted that, based on the principles underlying the independent source
doctrine, the Murray Court had determined that the doctrine might justify the introduction of evidence discovered during a legal search that
had originally been observed in plain view during a prior illegal entry.' 0 0 The Third Circuit further acknowledged that, in deciding
whether such evidence was admissible, the Murray majority had focused
on the question of whether the search pursuant to the warrant was in
fact a "genuinely independent source" of the evidence at issue.10 1
The Herrold court continued its analysis based on the independent
source guidelines set forth in Murray, but modified its analysis to reflect
the fact that in Herrold, the independent source that the prosecution
sought to establish-a subsequent valid search-was based upon a partially tainted warrant. 10 2 Utilizing the Murray analysis, the court first
sought to determine whether the police would have applied for the
search warrant without regard to the information obtained during the
prior illegal entry. 10 3 The court reasoned that based on the knowledge
97. Id.

98. Id. at 1139-40.
99. Id. at 1139. Specifically, the Third Circuit acknowledged that the
Supreme Court had developed the independent source doctrine as a corollary to
the exclusionary rule because:
'the interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the
public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime
are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse
position, that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct
had occurred ....

When the challenged evidence has an independent

source, exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent any error or violation.'
Id. (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (quoting Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984))).
100. Id. at 1140.
101, Id. The Third Circuit emphasized that the Murray Court held that the
search pursuant to a warrant would not be an independent source of the evidence at issue if "the agents' decision to seek the warrant was prompted by what
they had seen during their initial entry, or if information obtained during that
entry was presented to the Magistrate and affected his decision to issue the warrant." Id. (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988)).
102. Id. at 1140-44. It is important to remember the crucial distinction between Murray and Herrold. In applying for the warrant in Murray, the government agents did not mention the prior entry, nor did they rely on any
observations made during that entry. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533,
535-36 (1988). In Herrold,by contrast, this information was included in the affidavit for the search warrant. Herrold, 962 F.2d at 1135.
103. Herrold, 962 F.2d at 1140-41.
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the officers already possessed regarding the defendant's activities, they
would have arrested the defendant if he had left the trailer and would
then have sought the warrant to search the trailer.' 0 4 Therefore, the
court concluded that, even without regard to the information obtained
during the illegal entry, the police would nonetheless have sought a warrant to search the defendant's trailer.' 0 5 In so concluding, the court
rejected as clearly erroneous the district court's conclusion that it was
"speculative" as to whether the police would have obtained a search
06
warrant absent the original illegal entry.'
Next, the Third Circuit determined whether there would have been
probable cause for the Magistrate to issue the search warrant without
the information included in the affidavit obtained during the prior illegal
entry.' 0 7 The court reasoned that, in addition to the illegally obtained
evidence, the search warrant affidavit contained details regarding the
surveillance team's observation of a drug deal between the defendant
and its informant and the results of a field test performed on the drugs,
under which they tested positive for cocaine. 10 8 Therefore, the court
concluded that even without the information obtained during the illegal
entry, the warrant affidavit still contained sufficient probable cause for
the warrant to be issued.l 0 9 In so concluding, the Third Circuit rejected
the district court's application of the Murray holding to the facts of
Herrold. 10
The Third Circuit asserted that the district court's interpretation of
Murray conflicted with the policy underlying the independent source
doctrine-that the police not be placed in a worse position than they
104. Id. at 1141. The court focused on the officers' knowledge of the defendant's previous drug convictions and on their knowledge of the defendant's
sale of drugs to the government informant. Id. at 1140-41. Also important to
the court's determination was the information previously communicated to the
police by the informant regarding the defendant's possession of cocaine and a
weapon, and the clear inference from the facts known to the officers that the
remaining cocaine after the informant's purchase was in the defendant's trailer.
Id. at 1141. The court's analysis also placed weight on the evidence that the
police had originally intended to obtain a warrant, but altered their plans when
they learned that the defendant was leaving the premises. Id.
105. Id. at 1141. Regarding the Murray holding, therefore, the Third Circuit implicitly concluded that the officers' decision to obtain a search warrant
was not prompted by what they had seen during their initial entry. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. Thus, the Third Circuit implicitly concluded that the Magistrate's
decision to issue the warrant in Murray was not affected by the inclusion in the
search warrant affidavit of the information obtained during the prior illegal entry. Id.
110. Id. Indeed, the Third Circuit stated that the district court had erroneously reasoned that because the warrant affidavit contained information discovered during the unlawful entry, such information necessarily "affected" the
Magistrate's decision to issue the warrant. Id.
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otherwise would have been in, had they not engaged in the illegal conduct. II ' To advance this policy, the Third Circuit asserted that the Murray Court's use of the word "affect" must be understood in a
"substantive" manner. 12 Therefore, the court reasoned that police officers' inclusion in a warrant application of information obtained during
an unlawful entry does not "per force" indicate that the illegally obtained information "affected" the Magistrate's decision to issue the warrant.' 1 3 Moreover, the court concluded that the inclusion of such
improper information in the search warrant affidavit does not automati14
cally vitiate the applicability of the independent source doctrine.
Rather, if the warrant application contains probable cause apart from
the improper information, the warrant will be lawful and the independent source doctrine will apply, as long as the officers are not prompted
to obtain a search warrant by what they observe during their initial unlawful entry." 15
The Third Circuit noted that its result harmonized the tainted warrant and independent source doctrines. 1 6 Furthermore, the court asserted that its implementation of the Murray guidelines effectively
preserved the policy underlying the independent source doctrine, of ensuring that the police are not placed in a worse position than they would
otherwise have been in had they not violated the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights. 17 In addition, the Third Circuit maintained that its
decision would not provide the police with an incentive to avoid the warrant requirement, because by its nature, the decision would only apply
when the police had subsequently obtained a warrant.' 18 The court emphasized that any information discovered in a prior unlawful search
would be useless to the police in a subsequent warrant application, and
thus the court's decision would not give the police any incentive to
111. Id.
112. Id. The Murray Court held that the search pursuant to a warrant would
not be an independent source of the evidence at issue if "the agents' decision to
seek the warrant was prompted by what they had seen during the initial entry, or
if information obtained during that entry was presented to the Magistrate and
affected his decision to issue the warrant." United States v. Murray, 487 U.S. 531,
542 (1988) (emphasis added).
113. Herrold, 962 F.2d at 1141.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1141-42. In this regard, the Third Circuit concluded that the
government was not required to show that the Magistrate's decision to grant the
search warrant was entirely independent of the information acquired during the
illegal warrantless entry. Id. at 1143. Rather, the government had the burden of
establishing that a neutral magistrate would have issued a warrant based on the
untainted information contained in the affidavit, which the police had obtained
prior to their illegal entry. Id.
116. Id. at 1144.
117. Id.
118. Id. The Third Circuit stated that its result was dependent upon its
conclusion that the police would have obtained the search warrant even if the
initial unlawful entry had not taken place. Id.
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search premises first without a warrant. 119 Consequently, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's order denying the Government's motion for reconsideration and remanded the case to the district court for
trial, with none of the evidence obtained in either search suppressed on
120
the basis of the exclusionary rule.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Herrold court's interpretation of the Murray holding was in accord with the Third Circuit's pre-Murray decisions concerning partially
tainted warrants,1 2 ' as well as with the decisions of other circuits in this
context.122 Notably, the Third Circuit was not the first court of appeals
1 23
to extend the Murray holding to a partially tainted warrant situation.
Indeed, prior to Herrold, both the Ninth Circuit in Salas and the D.C.
Circuit in Halliman cited Murray as authority for the proposition that evidence "rediscovered" pursuant to a search warrant was admissible, despite the fact that the search warrant affidavit was partially tainted by the
119. Id. The Third Circuit's opinion in Herrold, however, failed to address
the concern of the Murray dissent that such a holding would undermine the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule. For further discussion of the concerns of the Murray dissent, see supra note 51.
120. Herrold, 962 F.2d at 1144. The Third Circuit acknowledged that the
gun, which was actually seized by police during the illegal entry, presented a
special and independent question. Id. at 1143. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the gun should be treated as being seized pursuant to the search
warrant and was thus admissible under the independent source doctrine. Id.
The court reasoned that it would be dangerous for police to leave a loaded
weapon unsecured until they obtained a warrant, and senseless to require the
formality of physically reseizing the gun. Id.
121. See United States v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1214 (1983). Johnson was a pre-Murray Third Circuit decision holding a
search warrant valid even though the search warrant application was tainted by
evidence seized unlawfully during a prior search. Id. at 63. For a further discussion of the Johnson facts and holding, see supra notes 52-55 and accompanying
text.
122. Several circuits have held in pre-Murray decisions that search warrants
were valid even though the warrant applications contained tainted factual averments, as long as probable cause still existed upon excising such tainted factual
averments from the warrant applications. See, e.g., United States v. Driver, 776
F.2d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that "[a] warrant may be upheld even
where it contains tainted and untainted facts as long as the untainted portions
contain a sufficient showing of probable cause to render the warrant valid" (citing United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 554-56 (1974))); United States v.
Antone, 753 F.2d 1301, 1307 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding search warrant valid because information gained through prior illegal search constituted only small part
of information included in search warrant affidavit); United States v. Mankani,
738 F.2d 538, 545 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that court must set aside tainted material in affidavit and determine if remaining facts demonstrate probable cause).
123. See United States v. Halliman, 923 F.2d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(holding that independent source doctrine applied despite tainted warrant affidavit); United States v. Salas, 879 F.2d 530, 537-38 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 979 (1989).
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inclusion of information derived from a previous illegal entry.1 24 Moreover, subsequent to the Third Circuit's decision in Herrold, the United
25
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Restrepo 1
also extended the Murray holding to a partially tainted warrant situation,
citing with approval the Herrold court's interpretation of the Murray
26
Court's use of the word "affect."'
Although the Murray decision has been consistently followed by
lower courts, it has been the subject of stinging criticism by commentators. 12 7 Furthermore, it is important to recognize that Murray was a
124. For a further discussion of the Hallimanand Salas cases, see supra notes
60-64 and accompanying text.
125. 966 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 968 (1993). In
Restrepo, police officers conducted a warrantless "security sweep" that was later
held to be violative of the criminal defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at
968. The police officers subsequently applied for a search warrant, and included
in the affidavit the events that took place during the illegal search, including the
fact that they had found the defendant hiding on the premises. Id. at 967-68.
Relying on Murray, the district court in Restrepo concluded that the search warrant could not constitute an independent source of the evidence subsequently
seized, because the search warrant affidavit had contained tainted factual averments derived from the previous unlawful entry, which affected the Magistrate's
decision to issue the warrant. Id. at 968. Similar to the district court in Herrold,
the district court in Restrepo interpreted the Murray Court's use of the word "affect" as requiring the court to consider the actual effect of the illegally acquired

information contained in the warrant affidavit on the decision of the Magistrate

to issue the search warrant. Id. at 969. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit rejected the Restrepo district court's interpretation, relying in
part on the Third Circuit's rejection of a similar interpretation by the district
court in Herrold. Id. at 970. The Restrepo court ultimately concluded that after
excising the tainted evidence from the search warrant affidavit, sufficient facts
still existed to establish probable cause. Id. at 971.
126. Id. at 970. The Fifth Circuit noted that the "affects" phrase was almost certainly a paraphrase of the approach long sanctioned by the circuits and
that the Third Circuit's decision in Herrold "makes this point abundantly clear."
Id. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit noted that it had found "no other post-Murray
circuit cases concerning the independent source doctrine that have interpreted
Murray as refuting their pre-Murray holdings that inclusion of illegally-acquired
information on a warrant affidavit does not invalidate the warrant if the affidavit's other averments set forth probable cause." Id.
127. See The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143,
162 (1988) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (commenting that Murray Court "eviscerated its protection of [F]ourth [A]mendment rights by expanding the scope of an
exception to the exclusionary rule while dismissing too easily the undesirable

effects its decision will have on deterrence of police misconduct"); Craig M.

Bradley, Murray v. United States: The Bell Tolls for the Search Warrant Requirement,
64 IND. L.J. 907, 915 (1989) (discussing Murray and asserting that "[b]y a series
of logical thrusts, the [Murray] Court guts not only the warrant requirement but
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine as well"); Fee, supra note 50, at 371
(citing Murray as example of Supreme Court placing greater value on law enforcement than on personal liberties, and noting that Murray Court had in-

creased ability of law enforcement officers to conduct warrantless searches by

expanding scope of independent source doctrine); Kirchmeier, Note, supra note
50, at 650 (discussing Murray and asserting that Murray Court honed a rule that
provided little deterrence to unlawful police conduct, thereby shifting its focus
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four-to-three decision in which the majority and dissent were sharply
divided on issues fundamental to Fourth Amendment protection.' 28
Nonetheless, cases decided subsequent to Murray, including Herrold,
have lacked both dissenting opinions and substantive discussion of the
important policy issues raised by the Murray dissent and focused on by
12 9
commentators critical of the Murray decision.
This apparent lack of decisional tension in the lower courts is particularly alarming in Herrold-type cases, because in such cases the Murray
holding is extended beyond its facts to encompass situations in which
officers include evidence obtained during their prior illegal entry in the
search warrant affidavit.' 3 0 This additional factual element bolsters the
plausibility of the Murray dissent's argument that allowing illegally discovered evidence to be "rediscovered" pursuant to a subsequently issued search warrant provides police with an incentive to conduct illegal
"confirmatory" searches before attempting to obtain a warrant. 131 Indeed, while in Murray the search warrant affidavit contained no indicia of
evidence discovered during the prior unlawful search, the affidavit in
Herrold did include such illegally obtained evidence and still no exclusionary sanction attached to the unlawful police conduct. 1 32 Based
upon the Murray and Herrold holdings, the police have everything to
away from exclusionary rule's "core rationale" of deterring constitutional and
statutory violations).
128. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 534 (1988). The majority in
Mur.ay focused on the exclusionary rule's goal of putting police in the same
position they would have been in, had they not engaged in illegal conduct. Murray, 487 U.S. at 537 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)). In contrast, the dissent focused on the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule and
argued that the majority's holding would actually encourage rather than deter
police conduct violative of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 544-45 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). For a further discussion of the contrasting policies underlying the
majority and the dissenting opinions in Murray, see supra note 51.
129. Importantly, no dissenting opinion was written in the Third Circuit's
decision in Herrold. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 421
(1992). Furthermore, there was no dissenting opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the DC. Circuit in Halliman, United States v. Halliman,
923 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Moreover, although there was a concurring in
part and dissenting in part opinion to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Salas, the
concurring and dissenting opinion did not focus on the majority's independent
source analysis under Murray. United States v. Salas, 879 F.2d 530, 539 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 979 (1989) (Ferguson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Finally, a concurring opinion was filed in the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Restrepo, which disagreed not with the majority's methodology for
analyzing a search warrant affidavit under Murray, but rather with the majority's
conclusion under such analysis. United States v. Restrepo, 966 F.2d 964, 973
(5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 968 (1993) (Johnson, J., concurring).
130. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in Herrold,
which modified the Murray guidelines to reflect the inclusion of the unlawfully
obtained evidence in the search warrant affidavit, see supra notes 102-15 and
accompanying text.
131. Murray, 487 U.S. at 546-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
132. Herrold, 962 F.2d at 1144 (remanding case for trial in district court but
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gain and nothing to lose by conducting illegal "confirmatory" searches
to determine the utility of obtaining a warrant.' 3" Herrold conveys the
message that even when officers include unlawfully obtained evidence in
the search warrant affidavit, a search conducted pursuant to the subsequently issued search warrant can nevertheless constitute an independent source of the same evidence when it is conveniently "rediscovered."
In conclusion, although the Third Circuit's interpretation of Murray
may have been consistent with its pre-Murray decisions as well as with
the post-Murray decisions of other circuits, it is important for lower
courts applying the Herrold ruling to recognize the conflicting policies
embraced by the majority and the dissent in the Murray opinion.13 4 Indeed, the inclusion of the improperly obtained evidence in the search
warrant application in Herrold emphasizes the fact that the Murray majority may have improperly balanced "the interest of society in deterring
unlawful police conduct" against "the public interest in having juries
receive all probative evidence of a crime." 13 5 Unfortunately, if not carefully monitored by courts relying on the Murray and Herrold decisions,
this imbalance may ultimately jeopardize the Fourth Amendment rights
136
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not suppressing any evidence obtained during either illegal entry or subsequent
warranted search).
133. See Leading Cases, supra note 127, at 167 ("[I]f [the] illegal search turns
up nothing, police will have saved themselves the time and trouble of preparing
an affidavit and presenting it to the [Miagistrate; if the search is successful, they
may [under Murray] obtain a warrant and validate the results of the prior
search.").
134. For a discussion of the conflicting policy focuses of the majority and
the dissent in Murray, see supra note 51.
135. See Kirchmeier, Note, supra note 50, at 650 (suggesting that Murray
Court gave too much weight to concern of admitting probative evidence into
criminal trials and failed to recognize that this concern could be outweighed by
exclusionary rule's goal of deterring Fourth Amendment violations).
136. See Leading Cases, supra note 127, at 162 (noting that Murray Court provided police with incentive to conduct illegal "confirmatory" searches prior to
obtaining a warrant and "thereby undermined citizens' [F]ourth [A]mendment
rights to privacy and security in their homes"); Bradley, supra note 127, at 917
(noting that when warrantless searches, such as in Murray, are allowed to occur
without any exclusionary sanction attaching, "it greatly increases the chance that
the police will search the innocent"); Fee, supra note 50, at 412 (warning that
Murray sends message to law-abiding citizens that "the Supreme Court will make
many sacrifices in order to combat crime-including the sacrifice of basic freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution").
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